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Abstract—During the design of a security architecture for a 
web application, the usage of security patterns can assist with 
fulfilling quality attributes, such as increasing reusability or 
safety. The attack surface is a common indicator for the safety 
of a web application, thus, reducing it is a problem during 
design. Today’s methods for attack surface reduction are not 
connected to security patterns and have an unknown impact on 
quality attributes, e.g., come with an undesirable trade-off in 
functionality. This paper introduces a systematic and 
deterministic method to reduce the attack surface of web 
services by deriving service interface methods from 
authorization patterns. We applied the method to the 
Participation Service that is part of the KIT Smart Campus 
system. The resulting RESTful web services of the application 
are presented and validated. 
Keywords-security pattern, attack surface, authorization, web 
service, rest 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Every web application has assets needing protection from 
threats, e.g., web services. Thus, securing web applications is 
a major issue. Security must be considered during the whole 
software development life cycle to build secure software [1]. 
In such a security-based software development life cycle, 
security patterns are used during the design phase to solve 
common security problems and build a security architecture 
[2]. 
Security patterns in the security architecture can have an 
impact on non-security quality attributes of the whole 
software system, such as loose coupling or discoverability 
[2]. When using security patterns, it is helpful to know this 
influence on the quality of the application [3]. Additional, 
security should be applied as early as possible to increase 
overall security [3]. Developers are generally not security 
experts and a systematical approach can help them reaching 
quality requirements [4]. Regarding a concrete quality 
attribute, the attack surface, several metrics have been 
introduced to measure the attack surface of whole software 
systems [5], object oriented designs [3][6] and web 
applications [7]. 
In addition to metrics, there are methods to reduce the 
attack surface, e.g., by using the Top 10 most critical 
applications security flaws of the Open Web Application 
Security Project (OWASP) [8], by removing or disabling less 
important or unnecessary functionality [9][10] or by 
reducing the permissions of the application [11]. These 
methods do not offer the possibility to systematically reduce 
the attack surface and they do not describe their influence on 
other quality attributes. Additionally, there is no connection 
to security patterns that are commonly used in a security-
based development process. 
Thus, we propose a method based on security patterns for 
authorization to reduce the attack surface of web services. 
The method has direct impact on the service interface. It 
mainly focuses on web services having a manageable 
amount of authorization rules that do not change 
periodically. It reduces the attack surface, by reducing the 
privileges for methods on the interface to the minimum 
needed, according to authorization. Furthermore, the client 
can choose under which privilege a service interface method 
should be called. Both increase the security by following the 
principle of least privilege and secure interaction design [12]. 
Our approach additionally leads to service interfaces, which 
are compliant with the Representational State Transfer 
(REST) paradigm [13]. 
The method is applied on the Participation Service of the 
KIT Smart Campus system. The service uses an Attribute-
Based Access Control (ABAC) for authorization due to 
complex security requirements. The resulting web services 
of the Participation Service are introduced. The web services 
are analyzed using the attack surface metric of [7]. 
The article is structured as follows: Firstly, the needed 
background and related work are introduced in Section II. 
The approach is presented in Section III for two commonly 
used authorization patterns. The next Section IV shows the 
evaluation of the approach by applying it on the Participation 
Service. After the evaluation Section V discusses limitations 
of the approach. The paper gives conclusions and an outlook 
on future work in the last Section VI. 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
In this section, the needed background for our approach 
is presented. This includes the software system used for 
evaluating the approach, the Participation Service, security 
patterns used for our approach, and related work on the 
attack surface, as well as on REST and its constraints. 
A. Participation Service of the KIT Smart Campus 
The KIT Smart Campus (KIT-SC) system is a web 
application developed at the Karlsruhe Institute of 
Technology (KIT). A detailed description of the KIT-SC and 
its features is given in [14]. The KIT-SC pursues the goal to 
support students and employees at learning, teaching and 
other activities related to the KIT campus. 
The Participation Service represents a part of the KIT-
SC. It provides a forum with voting and discussion features. 
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Figure 1.  Scheme of the Attribute-Based Access Control based on 
[17] 
 
 
Following the principles of systemic consensus, this enables 
groups of users to make decisions on campus-related issues 
by using the modern, responsive web application. 
B. Security patterns for authorization 
With our approach, service interfaces are derived from 
authorization patterns. The steps are shown for two common 
security patterns: Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) and 
ABAC. 
RBAC takes advantage of the fact, that organizations are 
often structured in roles, e.g., students, employees and 
administration [2]. These roles have certain rights and duties. 
The rights of these roles can be used to model the access 
rights in the system. Thus, subjects get all rights through 
their roles. In this way, the process of assigning access rights 
is simplified by the usage of global roles instead of 
individual rights [2]. 
The structure of RBAC shows Figure 1. Subjects have 
certain roles and these roles are directly connected with 
resources. The concrete right is associated to the connection 
between role and resource. As soon as roles are not 
applicable or a more flexible access control is required, 
RBAC has strong limitations [15]. 
ABAC is a more flexible approach because of the usage 
of attributes as information source for access control [15]. In 
addition to static roles, which can still be realized with 
ABAC, access control can be defined for dynamic attribute 
combinations of subjects, resources and environments [15]. 
This structure shows Figure 2. Subjects are directly 
connected to resources. The right is associated to this 
connection and uses the attributes. 
Yuan et al.'s formal definition [15] is: S, R and E are 
subjects, resources and environments with pre-defined 
attribute sets SAn, RAn and EAn. A policy rule that decides 
on whether a subject s can access a resource r in an 
environment e is a Boolean function of s, r and e's attributes: 
canAccess(s, r, e) ←  f(ATTR(s), ATTR(r), ATTR(e)) 
where ATTR() is a function that assigns every currently 
valid attribute to a subject, resource or environment. 
Authorization using ABAC is, thus, more fine-grained 
than RBAC. But as negative aspect, it is more complex to 
implement. 
C. Attack Surface 
With our approach, we connect security patterns with 
software product quality according to ISO/IEC 25010 [16]. 
These are on the one hand the quality attribute attack surface 
and on the other hand quality attributes connected to the 
REST paradigm. In this section, we introduce the attack 
surface. 
Developers wish to anticipate the vulnerability of their 
software system prior to deployment. The popular concept of 
loose coupling and the distribution of systems or web 
applications lead to an increasing number of interfaces [18]. 
These are natural security boundaries that augment the attack 
surface, an indicator for measuring a system’s vulnerability 
towards external attacks [7][9]. 
The attack surface does not give information on code 
quality or high-value architectural design. And neither does a 
large attack surface imply that a system has much 
vulnerability, nor does a small attack surface mean little 
vulnerability. But a large attack surface indicates that an 
attacker presumably needs less effort for exploiting 
vulnerabilities [5]. The reduction of the attack surface, 
therefore, reduces the overall security risk – a product of the 
probability, the consequences of occurrence of a hazardous 
event and the asset value: Risk = Threat × Vulnerability × 
Asset Value [19]. Think of two web applications with similar 
functionality and value – the one with a higher attack surface 
is more likely to be chosen to attack amongst these 
opportunities. 
We use the attack surface metric for web applications [7] 
to evaluate our approach. The metric is based on parameters 
grouped into parameter families. These parameter families 
are Degree of Distribution, Dynamic Creation, Security 
Features, Input Vectors, Active Content, Cookies and Access 
Control. Parameters are, e.g., Role and Privileges for the 
parameter family Access Control. For each of the parameters 
a value is assigned, depending on the application. The higher 
the value, the greater is the attack surface and the higher is 
the risk for attacks, e.g., accessing the application as 
unauthenticated user has value 0, whereas accessing as 
authenticated or root user have value 5 and 10. The metric is 
calculated by calculating the Euclidian norm for each value 
of a parameter family. The value of the parameter family is 
the Euclidian norm calculated for each value of parameter in 
the family. The maximum attack surface is 60.79. 
In the next sections, we discuss methods for reducing the 
attack surface regarding our goals and service interface 
design. The author of [9] suggests several methods for 
reducing the attack surface of an operating system. His 80/20 
rule (according to the Pareto principle) to reduce the amount 
of running code contradicts our goal to not reduce 
functionality. Further, he offers no systematical way to find 
code to remove. The methods for applying least privileges 
and reducing access for untrusted users mainly focus on the 
system running the application. According to this method, 
we suggest that for service interfaces least privileges also 
means reducing the amount of accessible operations. 
Authorization defines who shall access operations and is, 
therefore, our starting point for securing access by reducing 
the attack surface. 
Reference [10] introduces an approach for removing or 
disabling unused code in operating systems. This 
corresponds to finding the 20 percent in the 80/20 rule of [9] 
and therefore, it aims to reduce functionality. Their general 
approach consists of two phases, the analysis and 
enforcement phase. In the analysis phase, unused code is 
found. The enforcement phase aims to avoid execution of 
unused code. They identify unused code by running the 
application and executing all available methods. Thus, this 
approach needs a running application and is firstly applicable 
in the implementation phase. We think that seldom-used or 
unused code could be avoided by considering security 
earlier. 
Methods for reducing the attack surface of a web 
application based on the Top 10 vulnerabilities published by 
the OWASP are introduced by [8]. The authors use security 
measures mitigating these vulnerabilities. The Top 10 entries 
are related to security vulnerabilities in web applications and 
therefore, they do not have to be connected to the attack 
surface. Thus, not all of the applied measures, such as input 
validation and secret tokens, affect the attack surface 
directly. A systematical way to reduce the attack surface 
needs to ensure this reduction. 
The discussed approaches aim to reduce the attack 
surface of in several ways. They do not offer a systematical 
way with concrete transformations to reduce the attack 
surface. Often the functionality of the application is reduced 
to ensure a smaller attack surface. Using security patterns is 
not part of any of these approaches. We tackle these 
limitations with our approach. 
D. Web Services based on REST 
According to the W3C, the term web service refers to a 
software system designed to support interoperable machine-
to-machine interaction over a network [21][20]. It is 
frequently regarded more as a system’s function of providing 
web access to its inner purpose rather than the whole system 
itself. Furthermore, a web application consists of web 
services, e.g., the web browser uses web services. 
The W3C distinguishes two types of web services: Those 
using REST-compliant interfaces and those providing 
arbitrary access [20]. While the latter have been primarily 
used in the past – presumably because of the ease of 
implementation – RESTful interfaces become increasingly 
popular, mainly for their lightweight and universal 
deployment [21]. 
REST is an architectural style for the communication of 
web services proposed by Fielding [13]. It relies on existing 
standards, such as the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), 
and defines six constraints for RESTful interfaces rather than 
concrete implementation specifications: The Client-Server 
principle, the concept statelessness, the usage of a cache, the 
uniformity of the interface, the layered system and the 
optional Code-On-Demand feature [13]. 
The uniform interface is the centerpiece of the REST 
architectural style: The interface describes every aspect 
trough resources. Every resource is identified by a unique 
address, which is in most cases a URI. Those resources are 
retrieved or manipulated via representations. A set of valid 
operations on these representations is available. Requests and 
responses are self-descriptive and semantic and hypermedia 
is used to describe them [13]. Hereby, a high degree of 
universality is achieved. However, it comes with a 
compromise in efficiency since the standardized information 
transfer leads to an overhead [21]. 
Since our approach alters the operations allowed on the 
resources, the compliance of the new interface to the 
uniformity concept is focus of validation. 
III. DERIVING SERVICE INTERFACE METHODS FROM 
AUTHORIZATION PATTERNS 
In this section, we introduce our method to reduce the 
attack surface. We developed the approach based on the 
following assumptions and formulated goals 1 to 6. First, 
current methods for attack surface reduction have 
inacceptable deficits, such as decreasing functionality (goal 1 
and 4). Second, non-security experts can apply the method 
and ensure security [4] (goal 2). Third, the method must be 
applicable at an early stage [3] (goal 3) on the KIT Smart 
Campus (goal 5, 6). 
 
1. Security patterns shall be connected to software 
product quality not related to security. 
2. A systematic way shall ensure certain quality 
attributes, including the attack surface. 
3. The method shall be applicable in an early software 
development phase. 
4. The method shall not reduce application 
functionality. 
5. The method shall be applicable on web applications. 
6. It shall apply for web services similar to the 
RESTful web services of the Participation Service. 
 
Before introducing the method, we align the term attack 
surface according to ISO/IEC 25000 and 25010. The attack 
surface is an inherent characteristic of software, because it 
can be measured with several metrics introduced. Thus, 
speaking in the language of ISO/IEC 25000 [22], it is a 
software quality attribute. We suggest to assign it to the 
quality characteristic freedom from risk and its sub 
characteristic economic risk mitigation according to ISO/IEC 
25010 [16]. Therefore, it belongs to the quality in use model. 
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+ createAsAttribute2AndAttribute3(): Response
+ readAsAttribute1(): Response
+ readAsAttribute2AndAttribute3(): Response
+ readAsNotAttribute2(): Response
+ updateAsAttribute2AndAttribute3(): Response
+ updateAsNotAttribute2(): Response
 
Figure 3.  Entity Service for Resource #1 of  Table 2 
 
 
TABLE I. EXEMPLARY MATRIX FOR RBAC WITH ROLES 
 Resource #1 Resource #2 
C R U D C R U D 
Role #1  ●    ●   
Role #2  ● ●  ● ●  ● 
Role #3 ● ● ● ● ● ●  ● 
 
TABLE II. EXEMPLARY MATRIX FOR ABAC WITH EXPRESSIONS 
canAccess(s, r, e) 
Resource #1 Resource #2 
C R U D C R U D 
attribute1(r)  ●    ●   
!attribute2(r)  ● ●  ● ●  ● 
attribute2(r) ∧ attribute3(r) ● ● ●  ● ● ● ● 
 
 
Concerning the method, the starting point is the 
authorization of the application and corresponding security 
patterns.  These patterns describe who can access resources 
in which way. Thus, authorization can be used to reduce the 
attack surface to exactly the functionality that shall be 
offered. Regarding the metric for web applications 
introduced in [7], our approach reduces the parameter family 
of access control. Other parameter families are not 
influenced by the approach and, thus, a reduction is ensured. 
Our approach consists of the following three steps: 
 
1. Set up an access control matrix.  
2. Derive services from the access control matrix.  
3. Create REST-compliant web services based on the 
derived services. 
 
The access matrix of the first step contains resources and 
operations as columns and policy rules as rows. For every 
operation allowed by a policy rule, the corresponding table 
cell is filled with a dot.  See Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 as 
examples. In the second step, a web service is introduced for 
each resource. Its service interface has an operation for every 
table cell having at least one marked row. Figure 3 is an 
example for this. In the last step, the resulting web services 
are mapped to a REST-compliant web service. Each step is 
introduced in the next sections. First, the main idea of 
deriving technology independent web services and its service 
interfaces is explained in depth. Second, the mapping from 
the abstract web service to a REST-compliant web service. 
A. Deriving Abstract Service Interfaces from Role-Based 
Access Control 
A role-based scheme for the access control with n 
different resources and m roles can be depicted as a two-
dimensional matrix (see example on Table 1). With the 
REST paradigm’s resource-oriented interface style kept in 
mind, we assume that four operations are possible per 
resource: Creating, retrieving, updating and deleting 
(CRUD). A bullet indicates that the specified role is allowed 
to use the specified operation on the specified resource. 
While in an ordinary RESTful implementation the 
interface would have provided access for all roles on all 
operations and all resources, our approach aims to reduce the 
overall number of accessible operations to a minimum. In the 
context of Table 1, this would lead to a reduction of the 
attack surface by the number of unfilled table cells. 
This is achieved by the creation of additional methods: 
Usually, one method is implemented for each operation on a 
resource. But by using our approach, methods are not only 
generated per operation but per operation and role 
(GetAsRole1, GetAsRole2, GetAsRole3, PostAsRole1, etc.). 
The difference is that each method can only validly be used 
by exactly one role and not by all roles possible. So far, the 
attack surface stays the same. The reduction is then reached 
by not implementing those methods that do not have a bullet 
in the access control matrix of, e.g., Table 1. 
B. Deriving Abstract Service Interfaces from Attribute-
Based Access Control 
Applying the approach to ABAC extends the principles 
of the application to RBAC. 
In the first step, all applicable operations for each 
resource of R are listed as columns in the access control 
matrix. Every policy rule of the canAccess() functions is 
listed as row. Every cell for which a canAccess() function is 
true is marked. A possible result shows Table 2. 
Deriving the interface from Table 2 works similarly to 
the role-based approach: A service interface is created for 
each resource. In every service, operations are created for all 
allowed operation. Example operations from Table 2 are 
readIfIsAttribute1, updateIfIsNotAttribute2 and 
deleteIfIsAttribute2AndAttribute3 (see Figure 3). To prevent 
long and complicated method names, it is best practice to 
derive canAccess() rules from single attributes only 
whenever possible. 
C. Application on Authorization Patterns 
Sections III.A and III.B show how service interface 
methods can be derived for ABAC and RBAC. This section 
shows that the method is applicable for any kind of 
authorization. 
In the sections on RBAC and ABAC, there are two 
limitations. First, the service interface methods are derived 
from access control matrixes for RBAC and ABAC. Second, 
because of the scenario and REST compliance, we used 
entity services [23] using only basic CRUD-operations. Both 
limitations are not necessary and can be generalized. 
Concerning the first limitation, the abstract security 
pattern Authorization defines who may access protected 
resources in which way [2]. The access control matrix 
contains the description of the entity (who) on the first 
column of a row, the resource to access (what) on top of the 
UserServ ice
+ createIfIsGuest(): String
+ readIfIsAdmin(): String
+ readIfIsAuthenticated(): String
+ updateIfIsAdmin(): String
+ updateIfUserIsResource(): String
GroupServ ice
+ createIfIsLAuthenticated(): String
+ readIfIsAdmin(): String
+ readIfIsAuthenticated(): String
+ updateIfIsAdmin(): String
+ updateIfUserIsOwner(): String
 
Figure 4.  User and Group Service derived from access control matrix 
shown in table 3 
 
 
TABLE III. ACCESS CONTROL MATRIX OF USER AND GROUP 
RESOURCES OF THE PARTICIPATION SERVICE 
canAccess(s, r, e) 
User Group 
C R U D C R U D 
Guest(s) ● 
       
Authenticated(s) 
 
● 
  
● ● 
  
User(s) = r 
  
● 
     
User(s) = Owner(r)       ● 
 
Admin (s) 
 
● ● 
  
● ● 
 
 
column and how the resource shall be accessible below the 
resource. Therefore, an access control matrix, as used it 
before, can be created for every kind of authorization. 
Deriving the abstract service interfaces from these access 
control matrixes can be achieved as previously shown. 
Create a service interface for each service with operations 
combined to the permission. The name of the operations can 
be of any kind, thus not only CRUD-operations are 
applicable. 
D. Maintaining REST Compliance 
In order to comply with the previously presented REST 
constraints, we propose to not realize the derived service 
interface methods with extended HTTP-operations. Quite the 
contrary: REST relies on a defined and pre-known set of 
operations – namely GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, etc. when 
using HTTP. Introducing new operations restricts the API 
usage to insiders, thus, adversely affects the interface’s 
uniformity and universality. It is also hardly possible in 
practice when using HTTP, since custom methods are not 
supported by browsers or most clients [21]. 
It is furthermore not advisable to realize the derived 
methods by using custom HTTP headers. To send a “X-Role: 
Administrator” header with every request seems practical on 
the first sight. But whitelist-based firewalls and proxy 
servers will skip those custom headers [24] limiting the API 
usage to clients that don’t rely on a firewall. This kind of 
limitation is not acceptable. 
However, a third way exists: We propose adding the 
service operation name to the request URI. Illustrating HTTP 
requests using the examples from above could then look like 
this: 
 
POST /resource1/?authorization=createAsRole3 
DELETE /resource2/?authorization=deleteAsRole3 
… 
GET /resource1/?authorization=readIfIsAttribute1 
PUT /resource1/?authorization=updateIfNotAttribute2 
… 
 
This is legal in the HTTP standard and does not violate 
the interface uniformity constraint of REST compliance. The 
server extracts the information from the parameter – a task 
possible with every framework and scripting language. 
Diligence is required in the implementation: The parameter 
must not have a fallback for an invalid or missing value. If 
that is the case, an error has to be thrown. Otherwise, the 
attack surface is not reduced for the simple reason that it 
does not differ from the traditional implementation. 
An appropriate error communication for that case and for 
the case of using a not allowed permission on the specific 
resource, is responding with HTTP’s status 405 Method Not 
Allowed. At first sight it seems uncommon to respond with a 
method-related error code to a missing or falsely specified 
parameter. However, as the parameter is merely an extension 
of the method according to the approach of this paper, it is 
suitable here. The list of “allowed methods” (more precisely: 
method and value for the authorization parameter) can be 
supplied in the body of the HTTP response. As a result it is 
possible to follow the Hypertext-As-The-Engine-Of-
Application-State (HATEOAS) paradigm. 
IV. EVALUATION 
In this section, we apply the method on the Participation 
Service of the KIT-SC system, show the resulting web 
services and give an evaluation. The Participation Service is 
developed by seven students during a practical course at the 
KIT. The group was divided into two teams, one focusing on 
the HTML 5 frontend and the other focusing on the Java 
backend. 
At the beginning the requirements for the service were 
collected. All required subjects S, resources R, environments 
E and their attributes SAn, RAn and EAn were identified and 
the access control matrix was built. Possible subjects are 
anonymous users and authenticated users. This publication 
demonstrates the method on the User and Group resources 
only, leaving out all other resources of the Participation 
Service for the sake of shortness. 
According to the requirements, both, users and groups, 
can be created, edited and displayed. Deletion is solved by 
setting a status flag to deactivated, thus, by updating the 
resource. The access control matrix in Table 3 shows the 
authorization rules based on ABAC. Users can be created by 
guests. An authenticated user can read user account data, 
create groups and read them. The owner of an user or group 
account can update its information. User with the admin flag 
are allowed to read and update users and groups. 
Figure 4 shows the derived abstract service interfaces 
from the access control matrix of Table 3. For each resource 
a service is modeled with the operations according to the 
access control matrix. This implies, that the services do not 
have operations for deleting the resources, because no 
authorization rule exists for this operation. Typically the 
delete operation would still be implemented, but inaccessible 
due to the enforced authorization. According to [9], this 
mapping is a reduction of the attack surface.  
The abstract service interfaces are then mapped to the 
REST services with URLs as follows: 
 
For the User Service: 
POST /user/?authorization=createIfIsGuest 
GET /user/?authorization=readIfIsAdmin 
GET /user/?authorization=readIfIsAuthenticated 
PUT /user/?authorization=updateIfIsAdmin 
PUT /user/?authorization=updateIfUserIsResource 
 
For the Group Service: 
POST /group/?authorization=createIfIsAuthenticated 
GET /group/?authorization=readIfIsAdmin 
GET /group/?authorization=readIfIsAuthenticated 
PUT /group/?authorization=readIfIsAdmin 
PUT  /group/?authorization=readIfUserIsOwner 
 
The Spring Security project was chosen to enforce the 
authentication and authorization of the KIT-SC. 
Authorization is implemented by adding the annotation 
PreAuthorize to each entry point of the corresponding URL. 
These annotations contain the access policies as Spring EL 
expressions, which are evaluated by Spring Security to 
enforce access control. Spring EL offers the possibility to 
state expressions on the attributes of resource and subject. 
Thus, the patterns delivered in the request, formerly 
introduced by our method, can be used to formulate the 
Spring EL statement. 
Using the approach of this paper in combination with 
Spring Security proved to be a good choice for many 
reasons: 
The attack surface metric of [7] has been improved. The 
access control parameter rights of the parameter family 
access control has been reduced from 10 to 0 or 5, 
depending on the privileges of the operation. 
Moreover, enforcing the authorization is easier, because 
testing functionality and access decision can be combined. 
For example look at the third row of Table 3. The user shall 
only be able to update its account. This constraint can be 
implemented and tested quite easily. Further, for 
enforcement of this policy, just the ownership has to be 
validated. This is quite easy, because the user data is 
delivered in the request. Without this limitation, the 
information must be collected separately. Thus, with a 
generic update operation, for each user touched by an 
operation call, every policy has to be enforced and 
corresponding data has to be fetched. 
Additionally, frontend developers benefited from 
associating the authorization to HTML forms, buttons and 
links. By choosing which operation to call, they get 
sensitized to security. Following the principles of secure 
interaction design [12], they added confirmation messages, 
warnings, colors and icons to the user interface according to 
the security level of the different operations used. 
V. LIMITATIONS 
Regarding goal 6, the method is based on at least three 
assumptions. First, the authorization may be exposed to the 
users of the web service and, thus, also to attackers. This 
may be a threat for the web service or even a problem 
regarding federation. We assume, that the system is secure, 
even if the attackers have this information, according to 
Kerckhoffs's principle for crypto-systems [27]. Thus, this 
information may be exposed without making the web service 
insecure. Despite this, exposing the information can be 
impossible. In this case, the web service operation name has 
to be obfuscated or the introduced method cannot be applied. 
Second assumption is, that the count of authorization 
rules for a single web service does not exceed. The policies 
defined by ABAC can be fine-grained using complex 
expressions. All these fine-grained policies lead through our 
approach to at least one service interface operation. In large 
systems this may be a great overhead. Many operations with 
potentially long names could be introduced. For example 
operations with similar functionality need an agnostic 
internal method to avoid redundancy and more methods and 
tests have to be implemented by the developers. 
Third assumption raised by goal 6 is, that the 
authorization rules do not change periodically or often. A 
change in the authorization rules may lead to changes in the 
web service operations and can cause changes in systems 
using the web service, when using the method. This depends 
on the change and on the mapping of the abstract interface to 
the language depend web service interface. In our REST 
mapping, the URL does not change, but a new parameter 
may be introduced. In this case, changing authorization rules 
do not lead to changes in systems using the web service. 
Even so, the web service has to be enhanced including 
overhead. 
Additionally, the approach introduced is systematical, but 
we have not used a language to describe access control 
policies. This is because we could not find a suitable 
language. Possible candidates are the Unified Modeling 
Language with SecureUML [4] and UMLsec [25] or the 
Ponder Policy Specification Language (PPSL) [26]. But 
UMLsec and SecureUML need to be enhanced, to support 
every kind of authorization. PPSL is not based on the UML 
and has no visual representation, but we think both are 
important prerequisites so that the approach is used. 
Another limitation concerning REST is the restricted 
functionality of HTTP’s OPTIONS method. An OPTIONS 
call to a resource is responded with a list of allowed methods 
on that resources and using one of them should not result in a 
405 Method Not Allowed error code. However, after 
applying this paper’s approach, the method name is not 
sufficient to formulate valid requests – information about 
valid authorization parameter values are required (see 
Section III). The response is expressed in a list of comma-
separated HTTP methods and there seems to be no 
possibility to additionally provide parameter values. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
We introduced a new way of designing interface methods 
by using security patterns. For this method, we showed that 
the attack surface on the interface is minimized according to 
the least privilege needed. Additionally, we showed how to 
combine the method with the REST paradigm and therefore, 
create REST-compliant web services. 
The application of the method was shown within the 
Participation Service of the KIT-SC. In this application, at 
least the disadvantage of creating many interface methods by 
applying our approach arose. However, the attack surface 
has been reduced. By giving a mapping from the technology 
independent web service to a RESTful web service, the 
approach facilitates a REST-compliant Participation Service. 
The approach gives software architects the possibility to 
improve the safety of web services using authorization 
patterns. They can follow instructions to improve quality 
attributes of the application in a systematic way without 
having a security background or knowledge. 
Software developers using the derived service interface 
are aware of the privileges when using interface methods. 
This increases the security according to secure interaction 
design. Furthermore, the implementation of the service 
interface can be easier tested, because the authorization 
offers constraints for the operation to be implemented. 
The disadvantage of creating many service interface 
methods may be the focus of future work. For instance, this 
phenomenon could be avoided by combining similar rights 
for the same object to one service interface method. Another 
starting point for future work is to research the advantages of 
the static in contrast to the dynamic access decisions. This 
can lead to an improved performance, improved security 
through easier testing and easier externalization of access 
decisions. 
Our main goal is to combine the usage of security 
patterns with quality attributes. This can lead to more precise 
predictions on the quality of software. Therefore, non-
functional requirements of stakeholders can be considered 
during the design of an application. By offering systematical 
methods, the quality can be ensured among the phases of the 
software development. 
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